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High-precision time synchronization for remote clocks plays an important role in funda-
mental science1–3 and real-life applications4,5. However, the current time synchronization
techniques6,7 have been shown to be vulnerable to sophisticated adversaries8. There is a
compelling need for fundamentally new methods to distribute high-precision time infor-
mation securely. Here we propose a satellite-based quantum-secure time transfer (QSTT)
scheme based on two-way quantum key distribution (QKD) in free-space, and experimen-
tally verify the key technologies of the scheme via the Micius quantum satellite. In QSTT,
a quantum signal (e.g., single photon) is used as the carrier for both the time transfer and
the secret-key generation, offering quantum-enhanced security for transferring time sig-
nal and time information. We perform a satellite-to-ground time synchronization using
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single-photon-level signals and achieve a quantum bit error rate of less than 1%, a time
data rate of 9 kHz and a time-transfer precision of 30 ps. These results offer possibilities
towards an enhanced infrastructure of time-transfer network, whose security stems from
quantum physics.
High-precision time-frequency transfer plays a critical role in current infrastructures sur-
rounding its real-life applications4, 5. The practical security for time-frequency transfer has
become an increasingly important issue in applications9, 10. The widely employed time syn-
chronization protocol today, i.e., global navigation satellite system (GNSS)7, 11, faces security
threats such as GPS spoofing8, 12. Beside microwave signals, although important progress has
been made for optical time-frequency transfer to achieve high precision and stability13–17, the
security issue remains unaddressed.
Existing theoretical studies have analyzed the security of time transfer based on possible
man-in-the-middle attacks18–21. One-way time transfer was proven to be vulnerable to the time-
delay attack20, where the adversary randomly increases/decreases the propagation time of the
time signal. In contrast, two-way time transfer was known as the more secure method, since
the time-delay attack can be countered by verifying the round-trip time. In general, security in
the latter is governed by three necessary conditions22 (see Table 1): (i) The two stations must
transmit authenticated time signals and time data; (ii) propagation time must be irreducible to
within a security alert limit; and (iii) the round-trip time must be measurable to one of the two
stations to within the alert limit. Condition (i) is to counter the intercept-resend attack for time
signals and data, while condition (ii) and (iii) are primarily used to defend against the time-delay
attack (see Methods).
Quantum technology brings new perspectives for time transfer, such as quantum clock
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synchronization protocols23, 24, quantum-enhanced synchronization25, synchronization with en-
tangled pairs26–29, and quantum networks of clocks with high accuracy30.
Motivated by the information-theoretic security of quantum communication31–33, we pro-
posed a satellite-based quantum-secure time transfer (QSTT) protocol, which can fully meet the
three security conditions (see Table 1). Based on the Micius quantum satellite34–36, we experi-
mentally verify the key technologies of satellite-based QSTT, including the time transfer using
single-photon-level signals from satellite to ground, the generation of secure keys via QKD,
the secure transmission of quantum-encrypted data and so forth. We demonstrated a quantum
time-transfer precision of ∼30 ps by using single photons as timing signals for optical time
transfer from satellite to ground. This precision is comparable to the state-of-the-art technique
of T2L2 on Jason-2 that used strong laser pules14, while the achieved timing data rate of ∼9
kHz is higher than T2L2 of 10 Hz. A summary of different types of time-transfer schemes is
shown in the Supplementary Table 2.
Fig. 1 shows the schematic diagram of QSTT. Assumed to have master clockA, satellite
Alice initiates the two-way time transfer with the ground station, Bob, who has the slave clock
B. The scheme is implemented through four basic steps.
Step 1. Alice and Bob mutually transmit single photons over free space for both two-way
QKD and two-way transmission of timing signals. We use the polarization-encoding BB84
protocol for QKD33. Alice prepares a single photon in the randomly polarized BB84 state and
at time of tAS by her local clock A, transmits the photon to Bob, and then Bob receives the
photon in certain polarization state and with an arrival time of tBR according to his local clock
B. Similarly, Bob’s transmission time is tBS , and Alice’s reception time is t
A
R. On the security
side, there are two major classes of attacks: intercept-resend attack and time-delay attack. In
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intercept-resend attack, the adversary, Eve, intercepts and measures the signal and resends a
new forged signal with her tailored time. To solve this attack, QSTT uses the polarization state
of the single photon as the symbol to represent the time signal. Thanks to the quantum non-
cloning theorem, any attempt to intercept-resend the single photon will inevitably disturb the
quantum state33, which can be checked via the post-processing (see Step 2). The other type of
attack is time-delay attack, where Eve randomly increases/decreases the propagation time of the
signal during its transmission. Time-delay attack can be countered from the known space-time
structure (see Step 4).
Step 2. Alice and Bob evaluate the quantum bit error rates (QBER) in the polarization
degree of freedom for the timing signals. If the QBER is below the pre-set security threshold,
then QSTT succeeds; Alice and Bob proceed to generate the secret keys via QKD and post-
process the timing data. Similar to QKD, the low QBER ensures the authenticity of the state of
timing signals against the intercept-resend attack. Specifically, Eve will inevitably introduce a
QBER of 25% for the intercept-resend attack31, 32. Thus, for the observed QBER Q, an upper
bound of 4Q of timing signals is assumed to be tampered by Eve. In our experiment, we divide
the timing signals into blocks and monitor the QBER for each block. We set a secure QBER
threshold of 1.25%, i.e., we keep only the secure blocks with Q ≤ 1.25%. This guarantees
secure data in each block with a 95%(= 1−4Q) confidence level. Only for those secure blocks,
we perform further post-processing by discarding the timing signals outside the confidence
interval.
Step 3. Alice transmits the encrypted classical timing data to Bob through a public chan-
nel, using the keys generated from the QKD. Alternatively, Bob can transmit his timing data
to Alice. Note that the keys can also be generated by previous QKD rounds. QSTT uses the
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quantum keys to encrypt/decrypt the data to defeat the spoofing attacks on classical timing data.
Step 4. Alice or Bob, having all the timing data, evaluates the clock offset τBA and the
ranging distance R with the coincidence time events of tAS and t
B
R , t
B
S and t
A
R by the equations,
τBA = (t
B
R + t
B
S − tAS − tAR)/2, (1a)
R = c[(tAR − tAS )− (tBS − tBR)]/2, (1b)
where c is the speed of light. To counter the time-delay attack, either Alice or Bob needs to
compare the measured distance R with the prior-known distance Rp: if the distance difference
|R− Rp| is within the security alert limit L, then the timing data is secure and kept; otherwise,
it is discarded. For this, we have made two assumptions: (a) the space-time structure near the
Earth is known and cannot be changed; (b) the satellite orbit is known and cannot be modified.
These assumptions ensure that the distance between the satellite and the ground station can be
prior obtained securely, e.g., via satellite-orbit prediction37 (see Methods). Furthermore, we use
the free-space channel between satellite and ground, in which the channel is mostly in outer
space and its propagation time is nearly irreducible. Notice that c in Eq. 1 refers to the speed of
light in the space time structure near the Earth, which is assumed to be known. Together, any
types of attacks to the propagation time can be countered in principle, according to Fermat’s
principle (i.e., principle of least time) for optical signals.
Overall, satellite-based QSTT can well satisfy the three security conditions, summarized
in Table 1. Nonetheless, the secure time transfer essentially needs the authenticity for both
the qubit state and the arrival time of the photon, which has higher security requirements than
QKD33. Consequently, the security of QSTT is not as strong as QKD to be against any attacks.
QSTT needs additional, but realistic, security assumptions to ensure the security of arrival time.
Even so, our scheme already offers much higher level of security than all previous time-transfer
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schemes (see Supplementary Table 2). An unconditionally secure protocol and its proof may be
obtained by combining the security conditions22 and QKD security proofs31, 32.
To verify the key technologies and show the feasibility, we performed an experimental
study of satellite-based QSTT between the Micius satellite and the Nanshan ground observatory
in China. In the downlink, we demonstrated the satellite-based QKD by using single photons as
the carrier of time transfer, whereas in the uplink, we performed standard optical time transfer
using classical laser pulses. Note that an uplink QKD, though not implemented here, is straight-
forward based on the technology demonstrated in satellite-based quantum teleportation36.
The experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 2. A decoy-state QKD with polarization en-
coding could be seen in the downlink. Quantum signals were generated by four laser diodes at
848.6 nm with a repetition of 200 MHz and a pulse width of 200 ps. A crystal oscillator was
used as the satellite clock A, and the emission time tAS of photon pulses was triggered by elec-
trical signals synchronized to this clock. A 300-mm-diameter Cassegrain telescope was used
to transmit these single-photon pulses to the ground, whereas a 1.2-m-diameter ground receive
telescope was used to collect the QKD photons with high efficiency. The photons were cou-
pling to a BB84 polarization-decoding module with one beam splitter and two polarization beam
splitters. Finally, the photons were detected by four single-photon detectors of approximately
300-ps time jitter. The arrival time tBR of each received photon was tagged by a time-to-digital
converter.
In the uplink, a 1064 nm pulsed laser was installed on the ground station to produce signals
with 0.8 ns pulse width, 15 µJ pulse energy at 10-kHz repetition rate. The pulses were sampled
locally and detected by a PIN diode for recording of emission time tBS by the ground clock B
which is an ultra-stable crystal oscillator. After transmission, the optical pulses were collected
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by the satellite telescope, and detected by a linear-mode-operated avalanche photodiode for
recording of arrival time tAR based on the satellite clock.
Quantum signals were transmitted and collected for about 100 s for one passage of Mi-
cius. A demonstrated satellite-based QKD could be seen in the downlink, with the time-tagged
arrival time of each photon. As shown in Fig. 3, we obtained a QBER of less than 1%. We
employ decoy-state protocol and the standard error analysis to post-process the secret keys38
(see Supplementary Note). The final secret keys generated between the satellite and the ground
amounted to 4,069,481 bits, which can be used for the encryption of the classical time-pairing
data. In particular, the QKD keys were used as the seed keys for the symmetric encryption
approach of advanced encryption standard (AES)-128 protocol for encryption of every 32 kB
time-pairing data with 128-bit refreshed keys. The encrypted data were transmitted from the
satellite to the ground via a classic microwave channel.
Accordingly, we paired the downlink and uplink time events to obtain two-way time
events (tAS , t
B
R, t
B
S , t
A
R) at a high repetition rate of nearly 9.3 kHz (see Fig. 3), mainly limited
by the repetition rate of the uplink laser pulses. This time data rate is higher than T2L2 of 10
Hz14. The time events were fit with the root mean square (RMS) residual. Fig. 4a and 4b show
the RMS results of 310 ps and 358 ps for the downlink and uplink, respectively. Moreover, with
the two-way time events, we calculated the clock offset and evaluated the distance between the
ground and the satellite (see Methods). We evaluated the time transfer precision by fitting the
clock offset data in every second and obtaining RMS residuals of approximately 250 ∼ 450
ps. The time precision σt was improved to 30 ∼ 60 ps after we averaged 300 raw data points
(see Fig. 4c), and thereby, the random error was consequently reduced. We applied the same
processing method to the ranging measurement data, where the rangings RMS of the raw data
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of within 11 ∼ 18 cm had its precision improved to within 1 ∼ 2 cm after averaging.
To identify the time-delay attacks, we compared the measured ranging distance and the
prior known distance, so as to guarantee that the time difference was within alert limit L. As
mentioned earlier, we experimentally achieved a ranging precision of 1 ∼ 2 cm with two-
way optical ranging measurements. The prior known distance between the satellite and the
ground can be obtained by the satellite-orbit prediction. Presently, Micius had an order of
meters accuracy for orbit prediction, being limited by the performance of the satellite GPS
receiver. Nevertheless, with the current technology, such accuracy can be easily improved to
centimeters37. For example, the international GNSS service (IGS) provides ultra-fast products
of GPS satellites of 5-cm prediction accuracy in the next 24 hours. Hence, with IGS, the alert
limit can be typically set to the nanosecond or even sub-nanosecond level in the future.
Overall, we have proposed a satellite-based QSTT scheme based on two-way QKD,
and experimentally verified the feasibility of QSTT in the satellite-to-ground link with sub-
nanosecond precision. We expect the findings of this study to generate new possibilities toward
a revolutionary quantum time-transfer network of a global scale.
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Methods
Practical security for satellite-based QSTT scheme. Secure time transfer requires the com-
munication security for both physical timing signal and classical timing data. The classical
timing data can be secure using the secret keys, generated from QKD, for encryption. For
the physical timing signal, there are two major attacks: intercept-resend attack and time-delay
attack. In intercept-resend attack, Eve violates the authenticity of the state of the signal by
intercepting the signal and resends a new forged signal with her tailored time. In time-delay
attack, Eve violates the authenticity of the prorogation time of the signal by randomly increas-
ing/decreasing the propagation time of the signal during its transmission.
Satellite-based QSTT can counter both intercept-resend attack and time-delay attack by
satisfying three security conditions22: (i) The two stations must transmit authenticated timing
signals and data; (ii) propagation time must be irreducible to within a security alert limit L; and
(iii) the round-trip time must be known to one of the two stations to within the alert limit.
The authenticity in condition (i) means that the signal itself cannot be tampered, which
aims to defeat the intercept-resend attack. QSTT uses the quantum signal, i.e., single photon,
as the carrier of timing signal to ensure the unpredictability, because any attempt to intercept-
resend the single photon will inevitably disturb the quantum state33. Condition (ii) and (iii)
are primarily used to counter the time-delay attack: for a symmetry time-delay attack which
increases time delay in both transmission directions, Eve can be found using condition (iii);
for an asymmetry time-delay where one way increases delay and the other way reduces delay,
condition (ii) is essentially needed to guarantee that the reduction in propagation time is not
possible.
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To satisfy condition (ii), we have assumed that the orbit of the satellite is known and
cannot be modified, which can be satisfied via the satellite-orbit prediction37. In satellite-orbit
prediction, the satellite acquires its own orbit information via the broadcasting of multiple GPS
satellites from international GNSS service in the outer space. The tampering for GNSS service
seems unlikely, since it requires the spoofing for all GPS satellites’ signals in the outer space.
In fact, the orbit information for most of today’s GPS satellites is already public.
In QSTT, the parameter L is determined by the precision of the satellite-orbit-prediction
technique37, i.e., the RMS of Rp. Quantitatively, the parameter L is the upper bound of the
precision of the secure time transfer, i.e., cσt ≤ L, where c is the speed of the light in the known
space time structure near the Earth, and σt is the time precision of the secure time transfer. For
each frame of data, we quantify the obtained distance R via Eq. (1), if | R − Rp |≤ L, then we
keep the time data; otherwise we discard the data.
In satellite-based QSTT, the free-space channel mostly in outer space between satellite
and ground guarantees condition (ii). Note that this condition was difficult to meet for a fiber
channel, except for additional countermeasures29. Because fiber has a larger refractive index
(∼ 1.5) than that of vacuum (1.0). Even so, in a rigorous manner, the optical index of the
atmosphere link is not the same as that of the vacuum. But, this issue is minor in our experiment.
The effective vertical thickness of Earth’s atmosphere is ∼5-10 km, which is much smaller
than Micius’s altitude of ∼500 km. Above the Earth’s atmosphere, the channel is vacuum in
outer space. Moreover, the refractive index of atmosphere is ∼1.000273. With this value, the
difference in time delay between atmosphere and vacuum over ∼5-10 km is ∼5-10 ns. In fact,
such time delay is at the same level of the orbit-prediction accuracy of the Micius satellite,
which can be considered in the security alert limit L.
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Pairing time events and calculation. We assumed that clockA on the satellite was a standard
clock, whereas clock B on the ground might have both a time and a frequency offset. The true
time tA of clock B at tB was tA = κtB + τ , where κ is the time scale factor of clock B and τ
is the clock offset at tB = 0. The reference frame was chosen so that the ground is stationary
and the satellite moves at a certain speed. No relativistic corrections were applied. The radial
velocity ν of the satellite could be regarded as a constant within milliseconds when it underwent
small acceleration at several tens of m/s2. If the distance from the ground to the satellite was
R0 at time tA0 , then the distance at time t
A was R(t) = R0 + ν(tA − tA0 ). From the satellite
ephemeris, we could calculate the coarse propagation delay of the signal pulses, from which we
matched the emission and arrival times of a given signal pulse: [tAS (i), t
B
R(i)] for the downlink
and [tBS (j), t
A
R(j)] for the uplink. Subsequently, we paired the downlink and uplink time events
to form two-way time events [tAS (i), t
B
R(i), t
B
S (j), t
A
R(j)], in which the emission times t
A
S (i) and
tBS (j) were nearly the same. Based on the kinetic formulations, we have the following series of
equations that represent the two-way time events,
c(κtBR(i) + τ − tAS (i)) = R0 + ν(tAS (i)− tA0 ) (2a)
c(tAR(j)− κtBS (j)− τ) = R0 + ν(tAR(j)− tA0 ). (2b)
Eq. (2) can be used to obtain all required parameters, including R0, ν, τ , and κ. The clock
offset and ranging distance from the demonstration experiment are shown in the Supplementary
Fig. 1. The clock offset drift there mainly came from the frequency drift of the satellite crystal
oscillator.
Data availability The data represented in Figs. 3 and 4 are available as Source Data. All other
data that support the plots within this paper and other findings of this study are available from
the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
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Table 1: Security conditions and satellite-based QSTT.
Security conditions Satellite-based QSTT
The two stations must transmit authenticated
time signal and time data.
Single photons serve as the time sig-
nals; secret keys generated via QKD en-
crypt/decrypt the classical time data.
The signal’s propagation time must be irre-
ducible within the alert limit.
Free-space link in outer space is adopted.
The round-trip time must be measurable to
one of the two stations within the alert limit.
The link distance is prior measured via
satellite-orbit prediction.
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of satellite-based quantum-secure time transfer. A two-
way free-space QKD is established between server Alice on the satellite and client Bob on
the ground. The QKD signals, encoded single photons, are used for time synchronization to
prevent against malicious intercept-resend attacks to the state of the signals. Emission times tAS ,
tBS and arrival times t
A
R, t
B
R of the QKD signals are recorded with the local clock on both sides.
Time data, encrypted with secret keys from QKD, are transmitted in the classical channel. Bob
calculates the clock offset and link distance with these secure data, and he can synchronize with
Alice’s clock at high security by comparing the measured distance to the prior known distance,
in order to identify the time-delay attacks.
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Figure 2: The experimental setup. a, An overview of satellite-based QSTT. A two-way op-
tical link is established between Micius and Nanshan ground observatory, where the downlink
uses single photons and the uplink uses classical laser pulses. b, Schematic of the transceiver
on the satellite. The downlink single-photon signals are generated by four faint laser diodes
(LD1-LD4, 850-nm), and they are encoded in BB84 polarization states. Emission time of the
laser pulses is determined by clock A (crystal oscillator) on the satellite. The classical laser
pulses from the ground (1064-nm) are detected by a linear avalanche photodiode (APD). Ar-
rival time is tagged by the time-to-digital converter (TDC). c, Schematic of the transceiver on
the ground. The single-photon signals are analyzed by a BB84 decoder and detected by four
single-photon detectors (SPD1-SPD4). Clock B on the ground is an ultra-stable crystal oscil-
lator. LA1 (532-nm laser) and LA2 (671-nm laser), and large field-of-view and fast cameras
(CAM) are utilized for tracking. A GPS pulse-per-second (PPS) signal is used for initial coarse
time synchronization. IF: interference filter; FSM: fast steering mirrors; CPL: coupler; BE:
beam expander.
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Figure 3: QBER in the downlink and statistics of the secure two-way time events. QBER is
calculated each block of one second in the downlink QKD, presenting an average of less than
1%. The two-way time events are a pair of secure downlink and uplink time events which are
counted by every second, and they are used for the calculations of clock offset and ranging
distance.
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Figure 4: Satellite-based time-transfer results. a, Distribution of downlink single-photon-
based time event coincidences, fit with RMS of 310 ps. The black dashed line indicates a normal
distribution. b, Distribution of uplink laser-pulse-based time event coincidences, fit with RMS
of 358 ps. c, Precision plots of time transfer and ranging. Both red and green data points are
calculated from normal points that are averaged from 300 raw data results for reduced random
error. On average, time transfer and ranging precision are about 30 ps and 1 cm, respectively.
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